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Abstract. An opportunist manager in property companies tend to take opportunity for himself  while aggrieving the owner over 
the decision. This study focuses on determining the effect of  managerial opportunism on capital structure decisions within property 
companies. Control from blockholders and capital market conditions plays a role in controlling opportunistic managers towards 
funding decisions. The data collected covers 25 property companies from 2000-2016 listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange. The 
analysis of  data uses logistic regression that is able to measure capital structure decision on dummy variable. The conclusion shows 
that managerial opportunism and capital market condition influence the decision of  capital structure, while outside blockholders on 
the other hand gives no effect. The contribution of  the study indicates that the role of  managers in company is deeply influential, that 
every manager who acts opportunistically would degrade the company's performance and harms the shareholders as well as investors.
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Abstrak. Peran manajer pada perusahaan properti yang opportunis cenderung mengambil kesempatan untuk dirinya, sehingga 
pemilik perusahaan dirugikan. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh managerial opportunism di perusahaan 
sektor properti terhadap keputusan struktur modal. Kontrol dari outside blockholders dan stock market condition akan berperan 
dalam mengendalikan manajer yang oportunis dalam pengambilan keputusan pendanaan. Pengambilan data dimulai dari tahun 
2000-2016 dan diperoleh 25 perusahaan sektor properti yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Analisa data menggunakan 
regresi logistic yang mampu mengukur keputusan struktur modal dengan dummy variabel. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan 
managerial opportunism dan stock market condition berpengaruh terhadap keputusan struktur modal, sedangkan outside 
blockholders tidak berpengaruh terhadap keputusan pendanaan. Implikasi dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa peran 
manajer dalam perusahaan adalah penting, sehingga setiap manajer yang bertindak oportunis akan menurunkan kinerja 
perusahaan dan merugikan pemegang saham serta investor.
Kata kunci: konflik keagenan; keputusan struktur modal; managerial opportunism; outside blockholders; stock market 
condition
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Introduction
A company's need of  capital could be obtained 
from the options of  internal or external 
funding source. When the need of  capital 
exceeds the internal funding source amount, 
the better option would be to use external 
funding. A manager would attentively decide 
on capital structure in order for the company 
to have a persistent competitiveness (Komara, 
Hartoyo, & Andati, 2016). Capital structure 
considers the proportion of  debt and equity of  
a company. In order to fulfill external funding 
needs, a manager and the stockholder would 
decide on debt-equity issue. A decision of  an 
optimal capital structure is crucial for the 
existence and performance of  a company 
(Ehrhardt & Brigham, 2011:328). 
Theoretically, a company tends to choose 
internal funding over external funding. In 
contrast, when a company choose to use 
external funding, the owner of  the company 
would most likely choose debt over issuing 
shares. When issuing shares, the ownership of  
the company would be shared with the other 
new stockholders. In the other hand, when a 
manager choose to use external funding, he or 
she would choose to issue shares rather than 
debt, in order to avoid work pressure in relation 
to debt repayment (Ooi, 2000; Gathogo & 
Ragui, 2014). 
A manager holds an important role in making a 
decision for the company's capital structure – 
whether it is by issuing shares or debts. In cases 
where manager only owns a small percentage 
of  the company's ownership, they tend to use 
the company's benefit for their own personal 
profit. Such situation is called as a managerial 
opportunism. In the agency theory, a situation 
in which a conflict occurs between the 
stockholders and the manager is called as moral 
hazard (Ooi, 2000).  The problem of  
managerial opportunism is notably related 
with the managerial system in a property 
company. 
The manager has a long period time to manage 
investments in property projects, while the 
return from the projects is not able to be 
achieved in a short time. The bigger scale of  
project development, the longer time of  the 
investment will be. A manager has a lot of  
chance due to his authority to use the 
company's fund for personal use, in order to 
create an image in front of  the public, 
particularly in relation to funds from down 
payments for developed or developing 
projects.
Additionally, the authority of  outside 
blockholder in the company's ownership 
structure indicates individual (not affiliated to 
the manager) or institution (including 
insurance company and foundation) that owns 
a share above 5%. The role of  an outside 
blockholder is to supervise and control 
unoptimal manager's activity (Kararti, 2014). 
With the large portion of  ownership, outside 
blockholder owns the incentive in investment 
decision making, incentive in company's 
capital structure decision making, and control 
over costs spent by the manager (Ooi, 2000). 
The existence of  outside blockholder 
influence reduction of  a manager's personal 
usage of  company's funding, so the agency 
cost could be reduced. In general, outside 
blockholder prefers to use debt as a funding 
option in order to keep the shares. In contrast, 
a company sends a bad signal to investors when 
issuing shares, because it would be seemed that 
the company is in need of  funding, therefore it 
could reduce the value of  company. The 
previous shareholder would be aggravated 
with the new shareholder ownership. Outside 
blockholder would try to protect their own 
importance by controlling managers who take 
part in the ownership of  company. They would 
make sure that manager does not do negative 
actions such as making investments that inflict 
loss to the owner and shareholder of  company 
or using profit of  company for the manager's 
concerns.  
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Previous researchers have shown examples of  
a manager's action that leads to their personal 
interest. Managers who have experience of  
investment would care only for his own benefit 
and would not consider benefit that the 
shareholders desire (Gathogo & Ragui, 2014; 
Ghouma, 2017). A manager's discretion in 
reporting the financial information would 
cause the manager to use his own judgment 
when the company faces a loss from debt. Also, 
the manager could manipulate income and 
expense of  the company while investment 
takes place (Kieschnik and Urcan, 2006; 
Stepanov & Suvorov, 2009). Some corporate 
financial scandals are related to managerial 
opportunistic incentives resulting from 
excessive capital expenditures, firm distress 
sign, financial leverage dan free cash flow (Fei, 
2015).
The financial structure of  a company shows 
the existence of  Free Cash Flow (FCF) earned 
after being used as capital or asset investment. 
FCF would define cash position available for 
shareholder (Rosdini, 2005). Funding through 
debt plays an important role in limiting 
managerial opportunism, especially when a 
company has a big FCF. Bigger debt would 
raise a chance of  bankruptcy and job loss for 
the manager, therefore would motivate the 
manager to reduce consumption as well as to 
raise efficiency (Rahayu, 2005). Ooi (2000) and 
Eriotis, Vasiliou, & Neoksmidi (2007) also 
identifies that both stock market condition and 
a company's characteristics are influential 
factors towards company's capital structure. 
Condition in stock market would encounter 
long-term and short-term changes that might 
influence an optimal company capital structure 
(Rahmiati, Tasman, & Melda, 2015). 
Therefore, in terms of  issuing and selling 
security, a company has to adapt situation of  
stock market. Meanwhile, the characteristic of  
a company in its nature would reflect 
fundamental condition of  the company 
(Eriotis et al, 2007). A condition that conflicts 
between a company's internal and external 
scope, especially a company in the property 
sector, depends on the company's firm size and 
free cash flow. Furthermore, it will carry an 
impact towards the decision of  capital 
structure.
According to the trade-off  theory, the 
different views of  manager towards choosing 
capital structure is to optimize capital structure 
in times when the benefit from debt and cost 
of  debt is balanced (Mutamimah & Rita, 2009). 
Asymmetrical information occurs between the 
manager and the investor. The manager has 
more information regarding funding decision 
than the investor, refers to a funding decision 
that is preferred by the manager and investor. 
Therefore, it develops according to the 
pecking order theory. Brealey, Myers, & 
Marcus (2008: 25) stated pecking order theory 
is a company prefers internal funding, for 
funds are collected without showing negative 
signals that could reduce stock price. If  a 
company is forced to use external funding, the 
options are either to use debt or to issue equity 
as their last option. 
This contradiction creates an opening for this 
research to observe the inf luence of  
m a n a g e r i a l  o p p o r t u n i s m ,  o u t s i d e 
blockholders, stock market condition, and a 
company's characteristic as a control variable, 
towards the decision of  capital structure 
decision, especially on property sector 
registered in the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX). Each property sector has their own 
uniqueness corresponding to their sub-sector 
(residential, commercial, industrial estate) 
which will be evaluated according to the 
fundamental conditions.
Capital Structure
Capital structure is the judgment comparing 
amount of  debt and amount of  equity owned 
by a company. In fulfilling the capital need, a 
company has the option to use internal 
funding through equity. Thus when a company 
uses external funding, it has the option to use 
either debt or shares issue (Huang and Vu Thi, 
2003). According to Gitman & Zutter (2015: 
546), capital structure is a merge of  debt and 
equity owned by a company. The company 
which choose debt as a source of  fund would 
get the benefit of  tax shield and as a result 
would raise its profit.  
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However, the company is obliged to pay cost 
of  debt, which is expense interest. Capital 
obtained through issuing shares could be used 
by the company only if  its debt has surpasses 
the received benefit or when the company's 
operating income is considered insufficient to 
fund the company. However, the option of  
funding through issuing share is not preferred 
by company owners since an issuing fee would 
be charged.
Akbor and Biekpe (2009) stated that capital 
structure is a combination of  long-term debt 
and equity. It is important to realize that a good 
combination would produce an optimal capital 
structure in relation to the source of  fund 
(Bayunitri, 2015). An optimal capital structure 
is a condition in which a company is able to 
combine debt and equity ideally by balancing 
the value of  company and the cost of  capital 
(Firnanti, 2011). Selection of  internal and 
external funding would have a different impact 
towards the profit earned by the company. 
External funding would reduce company 
profit because the company would have to pay 
debt, although at the same time the tax would 
be reduced. On the other hand, external 
funding would not reduce tax payment 
(Sutrisno, 200: 307).
Capital structure policy of  a company involves 
the existence of  trade-off  between obtained 
risk and return. Trade-off  theory explains the 
relation between tax, bankruptcy risk, and 
usage of  debt caused by capital structure 
decision taken by a company (Brealey et al, 
2008: 25). The optimal level of  debt could be 
obtained by balancing between the benefit of  
interest payment and cost of  debt utilization 
(Jahanzeb, Rehman, Bajuri, Karami, & 
Ahmadimousaabad, 2014). The use of  debt 
would only increase the value of  the company 
to a certain point and beyond that points, it 
would decrease its amount. Improving the 
benefits of  debt, however, is not comparable 
to the cost of  bankruptcy and agency problem. 
The returning point is called optimal capital 
structure that shows an optimal amount of  
debt (Kodrat & Herdinata, 2009: 113).
Sheikh & Wang (2010) stated that trade-off  
theory is expected to be used in choosing a 
capital structure to maximize value of  a 
company with the least cost. The flaw of  this 
theory is that it is unable to precisely decide the 
optimal capital structure. However, some 
points are to be taken into notice:
a.	 A company with a higher asset value would 
have a big probability of  financial distress 
which leads to use of  debt.
b.	 Fixed assets, intangible assets, and the 
chance for a company to grow would reduce 
in value when a financial distress occurs. A 
company with this kind of  asset would want 
to make a small number of debt.
c.	 A company obliged to pay a high amount of  
tax should preferably use debt compared 
with a company obliged to pay a low 
amount of  tax.
Even though a trade-off  theory model might 
look logical, empirically the supporting proofs 
are not strong enough. This fact shows that 
there are factors not yet considered in the 
model (Atmaja, 2008: 260) that require further 
observation.
Pecking Order Theory
Pecking order theory stated that a company has 
certain choices in managing capital for its 
funding (Atiyet, 2012). Pecking order theory 
shows that a company prefers internal source 
of  fund rather than external source. Given 
that, when a company needs external source of  
fund, the manager would tend to choose 
securities such as debt (Sudana, 2011: 156). 
The argument of  pecking order theory is 
asymmetrical information that creates a 
hierarchy on cost of  external funding (Tong & 
Green, 2005).
As predicted by the pecking order theory, 
external funding is the final option for a 
company (Bistrova, Lace, & Peleckiene, 2011). 
A manager tends to issue shares when the share 
is overvalued, and tend to issue debt when the 
debt is overvalued (Sudana, 2011: 152). The 
weakness of  pecking order theory is that it puts 
aside agency issue that could possibly surface 
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One internal source of  company fund is free 
cash flow (FCF), which is a position in which 
cash is truly available for the stockholder of  the 
company (Rosdini, 2005). Damodaran 
(2015:312) also stated that FCF is a cash flow 
available for the investor after the calculation 
of  tax payment and investment needs. FCF 
could also be used as discretionary such as 
acquisition, credit payment, and payment to 
stockholder. With a bigger amount of  FCF 
o w n e d ,  a  c o m p a n y ' s  w e l l - b e i n g  i s 
demonstrated because it has the sufficient cash 
in store for the company's growth, debt 
repayment, and dividend payout (Rosdini, 
2005). The manager would put an effort in 
ut i l iz ing FCF for the importance of  
reinvestment. The purpose is to raise the 
company's productivity which would raise the 
potential of  company growth (Syafi'i 2011).
Agency Theory
The position of  a manager in the agency theory 
explains the contractual relationship between 
the owner as the principal who gives the 
authority, and the manager as the agent of  the 
company who submits to the authority. The 
owner implicitly agree to give such financial 
privileges (“financial carrots”) to their manager 
(Dion, 2016). This relationship is in the form 
of  cooperative contract. Agency theory 
assumes that each individual is solely motivated 
by his own motives, which creates a conflict 
between the interest of  a principal and an 
agent. Such conflict is caused by a separation 
between ownership and management of  the 
company. In its development, agency theory is 
divided into two courses:
1. Positive Theory of  Agency, which focuses 
on the identification of  situation when 
stockholder and manager as the agent 
clashes, yet the government regulation that 
limits self-saving force act within the agent. 
2. Principal Agent Literature, which focuses 
on the optimal contract between the attitude 
and the  resu l t  emphas ized  in  the 
relationship between stockholder and agent 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
According to Eisenhard (1989) agency theory 
is based upon 3 (three) assumptions:
a.	 Assumption of  human behavior
	 Assumpt ion  o f  human  behav io r 
emphasize that human has the nature of  
self-interest, bounded rationality, and risk 
aversion.
b.	 Organizational assumption
	 Organizational assumption reveals the 
conflict between organization members, 
uses eff ic iency as  the cr i ter ia  of  
productivity, and conduct the existence of  
Asymmetric Information (AI) between 
principal and agent.
c.	 Assumption of  Information.
 Assumption of  information states that 
information is viewed as a tradable 
commodity.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) differentiate 
asymmetric information into two: adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Firstly, adverse 
selection is condition where the principle is 
unable to perceive whether the decision made 
by the agent is accurately based upon obtained 
information or as a negligence of  duty. On the 
other hand, moral hazard is the problem raised 
when the agent fails to carry out things that has 
been agreed upon an employment contract.
Managerial Opportunism & Outside Blockholders
A manager could do action that does not 
benefit the company as a whole or even 
disadvantageous on the longer term. Granted 
that, shareholders as the fund and facility 
provider, has the concern of  securing the fund 
and facility used in the operation of  the 
company, because they are concerned about 
the security of  the funds invested into the 
company. An opportunistic act by a manager 
to use the company's fund for his personal use 
according to the number of  shares the 
manager owned is  ca l led manager ia l 
opportunism. It is a situation where the 
manager is also a shareholder of  the company 
(Christiawan & Tarigan, 2007). 
Furthermore, when the manager concurrently 
is the owner of  the company, there would be 
n o  ch a n c e  f o r  t h e  m a n a g e r  t o  a c t 
opportunistically. If  the manager does, he or 
she would also bear the consequence of  loss or 
even bankruptcy. The policy of  manager 
ownership aims to give the manager to be 
involved with the ownership of  shares, 
aligning the manager on the same position as 
the shareholders, who owns the company.
On the other side, ownership of  shares above 
5% from a personal (not affiliated to the 
manager )  and ins t i tu t ion  ( inc lud ing 
organization and Insurance Company) is called 
as outside blockholders. In a company, their 
main role is to monitor and watch over the 
company, as well as to prevent the manager's 
action that might bring loss to the company 
(Asmawati & Amanah, 2013). When a 
company has outside blockholders in its 
ownership organizat ion,  control  and 
supervision over the performance of  the 
manager could be tracked well (Dewi, 2008). 
Institutional ownership holds the biggest 
shareholder, making it a good means to 
monitor the management (Machmud & 
Djakman, 2008), for the characteristic of  the 
company indicates the fundamental condition 
of  the company (Eriotis et al, 2007). 
Ooi (2001) explained the character of  a 
company is indicated through free cash flow, 
tax burden, target debt ratio, default risk, and 
firm size that are used as the control variable. 
In other words, the variable is created to be 
constant in order for the free variable to be 
unrestrained from other undesired variables in 
the research. Trade of  theory states that target 
optimal debt ratio could be used by the 
company to consider the balance between cost 
and benefit of  using debts. The amount of  
gross income earned by the company 
decreases after debt interest, and therefore 
reduces the amount of  company's debt. On 
the other side, when a company uses debt, the 
risk of  bankruptcy escalates. The size of  the 
company would also ease the company's access 
to debt when the company size is smaller, their 
access towards debt is also smaller.
Managerial Opportunism, Outside Blockholders, 
Stock Market Condition against Capital Structure 
Decision
Managerial opportunism is indicated through 
the percentage of  managerial ownership. 
According to Antari & Dana (2013), an 
increasing number of  shares owned by the 
manager through managerial ownership would 
motivate the performance of  the management, 
because the manager believes that he or she 
plays an important role in the company both in 
decision making and responsibility. The system 
applied by the manager would affect to the 
company's performance, as the decision on 
funding is affected by the managerial 
ownership of  shares. 
In a research by Christiawan and Tarigan 
(2007) it is shown that a manager who is 
concurrently a shareholder would be more 
careful in taking debt policy because the 
manager would not want the company to get 
face financial crisis or even bankruptcy. Both 
problems would be disadvantageous for the 
manager's position. However, Ooi (2000) and 
Dewata, Sari, & Fithri (2016) stated that a 
manager who owns a company's shares would 
prefer to make debt than issuing shares. If  
share-owning manager choose to issue share as 
a source of  fund, then he will risk the 
ownership of  the company to be shared with 
the public. Such condition would direct a 
manager to prefer using debt. 
This fact does not agree with a research by 
Larasati (2011), in which shareholding does not 
significantly affect capital structure given that 
the manager's position is not to make decision 
even though he or she is a shareholder. This is 
due to the amount of  shares owned by the 
manager isn't comparable with the shares 
owned by outside blockholders, which exceed 
5%. Therefore, the funding decision does not 
rely upon the manager's decision. A company 
with outside blockholders wil l  boost 
surveillance control towards the manager's 
performance (Dewi, 2011). When the 
ownership of  outside blockholders increase, 
the use of  debt in a company's financial 
structure would also increase (Kamaliah & 
Syafitri, 2010; Larasati, 2011). 
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One internal source of  company fund is free 
cash flow (FCF), which is a position in which 
cash is truly available for the stockholder of  the 
company (Rosdini, 2005). Damodaran 
(2015:312) also stated that FCF is a cash flow 
available for the investor after the calculation 
of  tax payment and investment needs. FCF 
could also be used as discretionary such as 
acquisition, credit payment, and payment to 
stockholder. With a bigger amount of  FCF 
o w n e d ,  a  c o m p a n y ' s  w e l l - b e i n g  i s 
demonstrated because it has the sufficient cash 
in store for the company's growth, debt 
repayment, and dividend payout (Rosdini, 
2005). The manager would put an effort in 
ut i l iz ing FCF for the importance of  
reinvestment. The purpose is to raise the 
company's productivity which would raise the 
potential of  company growth (Syafi'i 2011).
Agency Theory
The position of  a manager in the agency theory 
explains the contractual relationship between 
the owner as the principal who gives the 
authority, and the manager as the agent of  the 
company who submits to the authority. The 
owner implicitly agree to give such financial 
privileges (“financial carrots”) to their manager 
(Dion, 2016). This relationship is in the form 
of  cooperative contract. Agency theory 
assumes that each individual is solely motivated 
by his own motives, which creates a conflict 
between the interest of  a principal and an 
agent. Such conflict is caused by a separation 
between ownership and management of  the 
company. In its development, agency theory is 
divided into two courses:
1. Positive Theory of  Agency, which focuses 
on the identification of  situation when 
stockholder and manager as the agent 
clashes, yet the government regulation that 
limits self-saving force act within the agent. 
2. Principal Agent Literature, which focuses 
on the optimal contract between the attitude 
and the  resu l t  emphas ized  in  the 
relationship between stockholder and agent 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
According to Eisenhard (1989) agency theory 
is based upon 3 (three) assumptions:
a.	 Assumption of  human behavior
	 Assumpt ion  o f  human  behav io r 
emphasize that human has the nature of  
self-interest, bounded rationality, and risk 
aversion.
b.	 Organizational assumption
	 Organizational assumption reveals the 
conflict between organization members, 
uses eff ic iency as  the cr i ter ia  of  
productivity, and conduct the existence of  
Asymmetric Information (AI) between 
principal and agent.
c.	 Assumption of  Information.
 Assumption of  information states that 
information is viewed as a tradable 
commodity.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) differentiate 
asymmetric information into two: adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Firstly, adverse 
selection is condition where the principle is 
unable to perceive whether the decision made 
by the agent is accurately based upon obtained 
information or as a negligence of  duty. On the 
other hand, moral hazard is the problem raised 
when the agent fails to carry out things that has 
been agreed upon an employment contract.
Managerial Opportunism & Outside Blockholders
A manager could do action that does not 
benefit the company as a whole or even 
disadvantageous on the longer term. Granted 
that, shareholders as the fund and facility 
provider, has the concern of  securing the fund 
and facility used in the operation of  the 
company, because they are concerned about 
the security of  the funds invested into the 
company. An opportunistic act by a manager 
to use the company's fund for his personal use 
according to the number of  shares the 
manager owned is  ca l led manager ia l 
opportunism. It is a situation where the 
manager is also a shareholder of  the company 
(Christiawan & Tarigan, 2007). 
Furthermore, when the manager concurrently 
is the owner of  the company, there would be 
n o  ch a n c e  f o r  t h e  m a n a g e r  t o  a c t 
opportunistically. If  the manager does, he or 
she would also bear the consequence of  loss or 
even bankruptcy. The policy of  manager 
ownership aims to give the manager to be 
involved with the ownership of  shares, 
aligning the manager on the same position as 
the shareholders, who owns the company.
On the other side, ownership of  shares above 
5% from a personal (not affiliated to the 
manager )  and ins t i tu t ion  ( inc lud ing 
organization and Insurance Company) is called 
as outside blockholders. In a company, their 
main role is to monitor and watch over the 
company, as well as to prevent the manager's 
action that might bring loss to the company 
(Asmawati & Amanah, 2013). When a 
company has outside blockholders in its 
ownership organizat ion,  control  and 
supervision over the performance of  the 
manager could be tracked well (Dewi, 2008). 
Institutional ownership holds the biggest 
shareholder, making it a good means to 
monitor the management (Machmud & 
Djakman, 2008), for the characteristic of  the 
company indicates the fundamental condition 
of  the company (Eriotis et al, 2007). 
Ooi (2001) explained the character of  a 
company is indicated through free cash flow, 
tax burden, target debt ratio, default risk, and 
firm size that are used as the control variable. 
In other words, the variable is created to be 
constant in order for the free variable to be 
unrestrained from other undesired variables in 
the research. Trade of  theory states that target 
optimal debt ratio could be used by the 
company to consider the balance between cost 
and benefit of  using debts. The amount of  
gross income earned by the company 
decreases after debt interest, and therefore 
reduces the amount of  company's debt. On 
the other side, when a company uses debt, the 
risk of  bankruptcy escalates. The size of  the 
company would also ease the company's access 
to debt when the company size is smaller, their 
access towards debt is also smaller.
Managerial Opportunism, Outside Blockholders, 
Stock Market Condition against Capital Structure 
Decision
Managerial opportunism is indicated through 
the percentage of  managerial ownership. 
According to Antari & Dana (2013), an 
increasing number of  shares owned by the 
manager through managerial ownership would 
motivate the performance of  the management, 
because the manager believes that he or she 
plays an important role in the company both in 
decision making and responsibility. The system 
applied by the manager would affect to the 
company's performance, as the decision on 
funding is affected by the managerial 
ownership of  shares. 
In a research by Christiawan and Tarigan 
(2007) it is shown that a manager who is 
concurrently a shareholder would be more 
careful in taking debt policy because the 
manager would not want the company to get 
face financial crisis or even bankruptcy. Both 
problems would be disadvantageous for the 
manager's position. However, Ooi (2000) and 
Dewata, Sari, & Fithri (2016) stated that a 
manager who owns a company's shares would 
prefer to make debt than issuing shares. If  
share-owning manager choose to issue share as 
a source of  fund, then he will risk the 
ownership of  the company to be shared with 
the public. Such condition would direct a 
manager to prefer using debt. 
This fact does not agree with a research by 
Larasati (2011), in which shareholding does not 
significantly affect capital structure given that 
the manager's position is not to make decision 
even though he or she is a shareholder. This is 
due to the amount of  shares owned by the 
manager isn't comparable with the shares 
owned by outside blockholders, which exceed 
5%. Therefore, the funding decision does not 
rely upon the manager's decision. A company 
with outside blockholders wil l  boost 
surveillance control towards the manager's 
performance (Dewi, 2011). When the 
ownership of  outside blockholders increase, 
the use of  debt in a company's financial 
structure would also increase (Kamaliah & 
Syafitri, 2010; Larasati, 2011). 
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Outside blockholders prefer to keep the shares 
to themselves, leaning them towards the choice 
of  funding through debt. Such condition 
would drive the manager to step up their 
performance in order to avoid inability to pay 
off  debts. Dewata et al (2016) showed that 
outside blockholders have a significant effect 
on capital structure. A higher number of  
outside blockholder would reduce the usage of  
debt, since a company who chooses to make 
debt has the chance of  payment failure which 
leads to bankruptcy. Such risk causes outside 
blockholders to agree on issuing shares rather 
than debts. 
Other external factor includes stock market 
condition, which significantly affect the 
decision on capital structure. When the bearish 
s tock market ,  through asymmetr ica l 
information indicated by IDX Composite, is 
showing a rise in the share price of  a company, 
said company stands to gain more profit by 
issuing shares. Moreover, asymmetrical 
information arises when a manager has a 
relevant information regarding funding 
decisions, while the stockholders has no such 
i n f o r m a t i o n  ( S u j a n a ,  2 0 1 0 ) .  W h e n 
asymmetrical information owned by a 
company reduces, it shows a good signal for 
potential investors, and thus encourages the 
company to take the chance to issue shares.
On the other hand, free cash flow, tax burden, 
target debt ratio, default risk, and firm size are 
used as controlling variables to fundamentally 
describe the performance and characteristic of  
a company (Ooi, 2000). When a manager is able 
to make a decision on capital correctly, a bigger 
free cash flow would be created. Free cash flow 
is defined as a company's income after being 
used as capital and investment. Faisal (2004) 
shows how free cash flow is significant in a 
company's capital structure decision: a 
company with greater free cash flow has a 
higher tendency to use debt. The use of  debt 
could suppress asymmetric information, 
pushing the manager to use free cash flow to 
pay for company activities which does not 
benefit the company and stockholder. 
Comparatively, another view states that a 
manager's behavior is monitored when 
investing through debt, so the free cash flow 
will not be wasted for unprofitable investments 
(Wu, 2004; Astuti & Nurlaelasari, 2013; 
Rahman & Triani, 2014). In the contrary, Ooi 
(2000) stated that free cash flow has no 
significant effect towards capital structure in 
Property Company listed in the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. Its amount does not affect 
the funding decision both for the importance 
of  the manager or the company owner. With a 
higher tax set by the government, the company 
are benefited when using debt (Ehrhardt & 
Brigham, 2011:73). 
Iriansyah and Dana (2013) displays that tax 
burden has significant effect towards capital 
structure decision, yet when the company tax is 
great, a company would tend to issue shares 
and not receive any tax benefit from debt. In 
another research by Widayanti, Triayati, and 
Abundanti (2016), it is stated that tax burden is 
insignificant towards capital structure 
decision. Corresponding to the trade-off  
theory, a company dares not to take a higher 
risk by funding its activities by making higher 
debt in order to obtain lighter tax from interest 
expense. A manager is required to take into 
consideration the balance between bankruptcy 
cost and the obtained tax saving. Also, a 
company would tend to use debt over shares 
issue when its position is above target debt 
ratio, because when the amount of  debt is 
measured with target debt ratio, it would 
significantly affect the company's capital 
structure decision (Ooi, 2000). 
Furthermore, the risk and the size of  the 
company would also affect to the decision 
(Puspida & Budiyanto, 2013; Febridinata & 
Fachruzzaman, 2013; Pertiwi & Artini, 2014; 
Wahome, Memba & Muturi, 2015). A 
company is in a higher risk of  debt payment 
failure when it has a higher debt level. In such 
condit ion, the company would avoid 
additional debt in its funding. In contrast, risk 
seeker profiled investor has less interest on 
low-risk companies and is more interested in 
high risking companies – in accordance to the 
assumption of  high-risk high return (Seftianne 
& Handayani, 2011).  
Finally, bigger company would also tend to use 
debt, because small companies have less access 
towards the debt market (Ooi, 2000). Although 
this may be true, Liu and Ning (2009) states 
that firm size has no significant effect toward 
capital structure. However, pecking order 
theory states that both bigger and smaller 
companies prefer internal funding compared 
to the external one. This goes in line with the 
statement by Firnanti (2011).
Research Methodology
Capital structure decision becomes the 
dependent variable that indicates the decision 
of  companies in search of  operational fund 
through issuing debt or long-term debt (bank 
debt and or issuing bond). Independent 
variables include managerial opportunism 
(MGT), outside blockholders (INST), stock 
market condition (MKT), and company 
characteristic. 
A manager's opportunistic behavior is 
measured by the percentage manager's 
(director and commissioner) share ownership. 
Outside blockholders are the amount of  shares 
by the manager's non-affiliates and institutions 
above 5%. Stock market condition is 
interpreted as the risk that illustrates the 
condition in which short-term and long-term 
change occurs, as well as impactful towards the 
macro economy condition (Rahmiati et al, 
2015). 
The characteristic of  the company is the 
control variable that defines the fundamental 
condition of  the company. It is measured 
through the indicators of  Free Cash Flow, Tax 
Burden, Target Debt Ratio, Default Risk, Firm 
Size (Ooi, 2000). Free Cash Flow (FCF) is 
interpreted as the flow obtained by the 
company after the operational cost is reduced, 
as shown in Table 1.
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that firm size has no significant effect toward 
capital structure. However, pecking order 
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to the external one. This goes in line with the 
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(MGT), outside blockholders (INST), stock 
market condition (MKT), and company 
characteristic. 
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The sampling method used is through 
purposive sampling in property sector 
companies listed in the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. The criteria of  samples are as 
follows: the yearly report in the research period 
has to be completely available as well as the 
manager's and outside blockholders' share 
ownership percentage information. Data 
sampling was taken through Bloomberg with 
advance research. Afterwards, logit regression 
technique is applied to analyze the data, 
processed with IBM-SPPS 21, with the 
following research model:
Logit (p) = β  + β  MGT+ β  INST + β  0 MGT INST MKTMKT + β  FCF + β  TAX + β  FCF TAX TDRTDR + β  RSK + β  SZE	R S K S Z E(1)
Hypothesis: 
M a n a g e r i a l  o p p o r t u n i s m ,  o u t s i d e 
blockholders, stock market conditions and 
control variables of  company characteristics 
influence the capital structure decisions of  
property sector companies listed on the IDX.
Results and Discussion
The sampling of the financial report of  
property companies year 2000 – 2016 in IDX 
show that 25 companies fulfill the criteria of 
purposive sampling. Among the total of  107 
data, 91 data chose to use debt and 16 others 
chose funding through share issue. Data 
discretion are shown in Table 2.
Capital structure decision of  a company uses a 
dummy variable, in which more company 
decided to use debt over share issue. Other 
indicators are counted according to the 
formula explained above. The average share 
ownership by managers is at 1.72% and 
50.53% at maximum (Rista Bintang Mahkota 
Sejati, Tbk.). The average amount of  the share 
owned by outside blockholders is at 63.15% 
and 98.84% at maximum (Plaza Indonesia 
Realty, Tbk.). The condition of  the stock 
market shows the average IDX Composite of  
4241.54. The result of  the test is displayed in 
Table 3.
The logistic regression model that comes out 
with the data analysis above is:
Logit (p) =	 4.786 + 11.955 MGT + 1.356 
INST – 0.001 MKT + 4.913 FCF - 
22.322 TAX + 0.047 TDR + 1.096 
RISK – 0.452 SZE
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Goodness of  Fit 
Test are applied to the model, resulting in the 
number 0.613 > 0.05. The logistic regression 
model becomes acceptable because of  the 
fitting data. Logistic regression coefficient 
value determination, according to the 
Nagelkerke R Square value of  0.265, shows 
that the independent variable can demonstrate 
26.5% against the dependent variable. 
The significance value of  omnibus test is 0.025 
< 0.05, as adding the independent variable 
would give an impact towards the fitting 
model. The result of  logistic regression test 
shows that managerial opportunism and stock 
market condition compellingly affect the 
capital structure decision in property company 
with the p-value of  0.045 < 0.0.5 and 0.011 < 
0 .05 .  Whi le  the  var iab le  of  outs ide 
blockholders, free cash flow, tax burden, 
default risk, target debt ratio, and firm size is 
not significantly affective towards the capital 
structure decision with > 0.05 p-value. 
ln         = Exp (4,786 + 11,955 MGT) = 92,28% 
ln         = Exp (4,786 - 0,001 MKT) = 82,74% 
The probability of  companies to have an 
opportunistic manager who chooses to issue 
shares is 92.28%, while the chance of  using 
debt is 7.72%. The equation of  the second 
probability shows that when the stock market 
is bearish, the company would tend to make 
debt with the chance of  82.74%, and would 
otherwise issue share with the chance of  
17.26%. 
Through data tracing, it is shown that sixteen 
property companies listed in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) chose to issue stock, while the 
rate of  managerial ownership is low at 1,72%. 
With a higher percentage of  stock ownership 
by the company manager, the decision of  
capital structure tends to issue stock than to 
use debt. Manager tends to issue stock when 
their control over company is not strict. This is 
because stock issues have a diluted effect on 
their voting rights. The downside of  the 
decision of  adding cash from new stock is the 
high cost of  issuing stock and the further 
d iv ided ownership of  s tock by new 
stockholders. Perhaps managers need to 
consider between the cost of  issuing new stock 
and the cost of  debt which is followed by the 
default risk. 
This is contrary to Ooi's (2000) research that 
managers prefer making debts rather than 
stock issuance. When companies choose to add 
more fund through debt, the probability of  
managers using his or her company's cash for 
personal gain is reduced. This will result in a 
higher pressure on managers to perform better 
in order to pay the company debt. This is in 
accordance with the research of  Christiawan 
and Tarigan (2007) which stated that managers 
do not wish financial difficulties or even 
bankruptcy on their company when using debt.
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Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std.dev 
D-E Choice (Y) 
Managerial Opportunism (MGT) 
Outside Blockholder (INST) 
Stock Market Condition (MKT) 
Free Cash Flow (FCF)  
Tax Burden (TAX) 
Target Debt Ratio (TDR) 
Default Risk (RISK) 










































































































Nagelkerke R Square 0.265 
Hosmer and Lemeshow 0.613 
Omnibus Test 0.025 
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market shows the average IDX Composite of  
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Through data tracing, it is shown that sixteen 
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Exchange (IDX) chose to issue stock, while the 
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With a higher percentage of  stock ownership 
by the company manager, the decision of  
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because stock issues have a diluted effect on 
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managers prefer making debts rather than 
stock issuance. When companies choose to add 
more fund through debt, the probability of  
managers using his or her company's cash for 
personal gain is reduced. This will result in a 
higher pressure on managers to perform better 
in order to pay the company debt. This is in 
accordance with the research of  Christiawan 
and Tarigan (2007) which stated that managers 
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Bankruptcy is disadvantageous to them both as 
a manager and stockholder. This is proven by 
the low number of  property companies in 
Indonesia that issue bonds (Suryowati, 2016). 
Acquiring debt from banks is an alternate 
strategy which managers choose from issuing 
bonds because property companies' income is 
dependent on projects still in development. 
Companies which need to pay bond coupons 
periodically until the due date increase more 
financial burden to the general performance of  
the company. Not to mention, the company 
incomes are not yet sufficient to pay those 
coupons and thus affect the whole company. 
Reviewed from the property sub-sector, there 
are four companies which have a portion in 
managerial stock ownership above average – 
three of  them are focused on housing 
developments. Building projects and house 
sales acquire their cash flow from booking fees 
and down payments. Those payments are often 
paid gradually in cash and is later continued 
with housing mortgage. The down payment 
period is rather extensive and varies depending 
on the house building process. Therefore 
managers have a higher chance to use collected 
cash for their personal gain. In operational 
activities, such situation can also occur through 
cooperation with contractors such as 
manipulating building materials input, 
regulating a cheaper construction cost, adding 
construction activities shopping items, 
compiling a cost sheet without correcting the 
quantity of  unexecuted work (Kundakchyan & 
Grigoryeva, 2016). 
Stock market conditions have a significantly 
negative impact towards capital structure 
decision. The outlook on the capital market's 
side shows that bearish stock market 
encourages managers to make capital structure 
decision towards debt. On the contrary, a 
manager's act to issue stock sends a false signal 
to investors because it seemed that their 
companies are lacking in cash (Sedianingtias, 
2010). Therefore, even in bearish stock market 
condition, property companies still choose to 
use debt as a source of  fresh fund so that 
investors do not give a bad review to the 
company's performance. 
Research from Ooi (2000) states that bearish 
stock market is indicated by a high IDX 
composite, it will be used by companies as an 
opportunity to issue stock.Further, the effect 
of  default risk, target debt ratio, tax burden and 
firm size is proven not significant for capital 
structure decisions. Managers as the decision 
maker of  capital structure tend to ignore the 
level of  default risk and target debt ratio owned 
by the company, as long as the decision is in 
their favour. This is not in line with the 
research of  Wahome, Memba & Muturi (2015) 
which states that a higher company's risk 
means it has a higher rate of  debt usage, which 
in turn causes a higher rate of  default payment. 
On the contrary, Ooi (2000) finds companies 
with high target debt ratio are inclined to avoid 
the use of  debt to maintain an optimum rate of  
capital structure. 
Widayanti, Triaryati and Abundanti (2016) also 
express that companies are unwilling to take 
the risk of  over excessive debt to fund their 
activity. This is done in order to retrench their 
tax due to interest. Managers have a lot to 
consider and they try to keep the balance 
between cost of  bankruptcy and tax saving 
which could be gained. Leverage can increase 
company value as well as to reduce tax. If  
companies do not wish to use debt but are 
profiting well at the same time, they are 
required to pay a higher tax and will not be 
benefiting from a tax reduction. This research 
states that tax burden does not have any effect 
towards capital structure decision. The 
amount of  tax to be paid by the company is not 
the only consideration for managers to decide 
funding. Property tax is more related to the 
value of  the object being sold, and is therefore 
burdened on the consumer as Value Added 
Taxation (VAT) and Luxury Goods Tax. 
Moreover, managers might make mistakes by 
ignoring the sum of  assets their companies 
own, which will weaken their performance. 
Ooi (2000) stated that the bigger size of  a 
company is, the chance to acquire debt for a 
capital requirement is higher, in which case the 
company might benefit from the use of  debt. 
However, this research shows that firm size 
does not have a significant effect: the number 
of  assets owned by a company does not 
influence capital structure decision. The 
existence of  outside blockholders does not 
have any significant effect towards the capital 
structure decision of  property companies as 
studied by Ooi (2000). The average percentage 
of  ownership of  outside blockholders on 
property companies listed in IDX shows a high 
rate of  63.15%. Among 107 samples, only 46 
represents an outside blockholders percentage 
that is below the average. It means that the 
portion of  outside blockholders does not 
affect capital structure decision made by the 
manager. Outside blockholders' role in 
monitoring and supervising manager's action 
does not affect the manager in making 
decisions, such as an opportunist manager who 
tries to skip a few preparations from cash flow 
projection and project profit forecast. They 
make the wrong decisions in investing 
company cash flow, therefore negatively 
impact the future company profit. Managers 
can even mask a bad performance through 
profit manipulation, which justifies further 
that outside blockholders do not affect 
managers' decision. 
This research also proves that free cash flow 
does not significantly affect the capital 
structure decision of  property companies 
listed in IDX. Jensen (1986) states that funding 
through debt is one among the many methods 
for creditors to monitor company activities 
and limit management's expenditure. Thus, 
managers would commit to pay debt and limit 
cash outflow. As a result, managers can avoid 
the misuse of  free cash flow. Additionally, 
another possibility is that anagers can use cash 
for personal gain by sharing dividend, since 
they also have company shares. 
Likewise, the last possibility is for managers to 
t r y  r a i s ing  the i r  imag e  by  o f f e r ing 
megaprojects to the public. Whereas property 
companies with sizeable free cash flow can use 
it firstly to pay off  debt before investing 
(Maloney, McCormick, & Mitchell 1993; Stulz 
1990).
 The high proportion of  debt in a company will 
result in a higher interest ought to be paid. 
Companies should be able to diminish the risk 
of  bankruptcy by using free cash flow to pay 
off  company debt (Syafi'i, 2011). Fei (2015) 
also stated that financial scandals by managers 
through financial management activities such 
as income smoothing activities are difficult to 
detect and it consequently impact the amount 
of  free cash flow.
Conclusion
The capital structure decisions of  property 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) are influenced by managerial 
opportunism and stock market condition, 
while the outside blockholders and company 
characteristics as control variable are not 
influential. Property companies tend to issue 
shares in its capital structure decision because 
the rate of  stock ownership by a manager is 
considerably low. Conflict as a result of  
managerial ownership will create a gap in 
management. Big property company may be 
managed by professionals who might have a 
small amount of  stock in the company. On the 
contrary, smaller property company may be 
run by the managers themselves. 
Therefore, big property companies have an 
elevated risk of  having opportunistic 
managers. The implication of  this research is 
for company owners to choose a manager who 
acts for the good of  all parties involved and not 
for the manager's interest. To better sustain the 
growth of  property companies, it is favourable 
that those in the position of  managers who 
double as stockholders to not take actions 
disadvantageous to other stockholders. Stable 
corporate governance will help managers to act 
professionally and in turn accomplish the goal 
to raise company value. Trust relationships are 
very important in this process.
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